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REGULATING INNOVATIVE MEDICINE:  
FITTING SQUARE PEGS IN ROUND HOLES 
MARK LAVENDER1
ABSTRACT 
Increasingly, innovative medical products are creating a 
quandary for the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) because 
they often transcend the FDA’s traditional categorical approach to 
regulating medical products.  In a recent attempt to simplify this 
process, the FDA has proposed a new rule for regulating 
"combination products."  This iBrief discusses the FDA’s current 
approach and analyzes the possible affects of the proposed 
regulation.  Because of the many shortcomings of both systems, this 
iBrief concludes that the FDA should instead stop assigning center 
jurisdiction based on a product’s "primary mode of action," and 
give the Office of Combination Products internal agency 
jurisdiction over combination products. This alternative approach 
would increase consistency and efficiency while maintaining the 
FDA's high standards for medical product safety and efficacy. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Among other responsibilities, the United States Food and Drug 
Administration ("FDA") is charged with ensuring that medical products 
made or sold in the United States are safe and effective.2  In effectuating 
this charge, the FDA assigns each product to one of three centers based on 
whether the product is a drug, biologic, or device.3  However, medical 
                                                     
 
1 J.D. Candidate, 2006,  Duke University School of Law; M.S. in Biomedical 
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2 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B)-(C) 
(2000) (referring to human drugs and devices intended for human use).  The 
FDA is generally responsible for promoting "the public health by promptly and 
efficiently reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the 
marketing of regulated products in a timely manner."  Id. § 393(b)(1). 
3 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(a).  Broadly, the definitions for the three 
categories are as follows: 
[A drug is an article] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease in man . . . [or] . . . [an article] 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man . . . . 
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 
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products on the cutting edge of technology are increasingly crossing over at 
least two of these categorical lines. Consequently, these "combination 
products" face a hoard of regulatory snafus. 
¶2 Within the FDA are three centers that oversee the pre-market 
review and post-market regulation of human medical drugs, biologics, and 
devices, namely, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER"), 
the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research ("CBER"), and the Center 
for Devices and Radiological Health ("CDRH").4  Although these centers 
are under the umbrella of the FDA, they are autonomous organizations with 
their own staffs, standards, and cultures.5  When a new, easily classifiable 
medical product is researched and developed, it is submitted to the 
appropriate center for review.6  Novel, innovative products that incorporate 
aspects of two or three of the classifications, thus crossing traditional center 
designations, are termed "combination products."7  In many situations, the 
appropriate center for regulating a combination product is not certain.8 
                                                                                                                       
 
[A biologic is] a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, 
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous 
product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease 
or condition of human beings. 
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2000). 
[A device is] an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, 
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, 
including any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for 
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease . . . or . . . intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the body . . . and which does not 
achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within 
or on the body . . . and which is not dependent upon being metabolized 
for the achievement of its primary intended purposes. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(h). 
4 FDA Product Jurisdiction, 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(b) (2004). 
5 See OCP Bridging Center Cultures at One-Year Mark, THE FOOD & DRUG 
LETTER, Mar. 26, 2004, at 6.  The differences are so great that the FDA is even 
developing training programs for the different centers to better grasp each 
other's varying procedures, standards, and organization.  Id. 
6 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(a). 
7 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e).  The regulation states that a combination product includes 
the following: 
 (1) A product comprised of two or more regulated components, 
i.e., drug/device, biologic/device, drug/biologic, or 
drug/device/biologic, that are physically, chemically, or otherwise 
combined or mixed and produced as a single entity;  
 (2) Two or more separate products packaged together in a single 
package or as a unit and comprised of drug and device products, device 
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¶3 According to the FDA, “combination products have the potential to 
make treatments safer, more effective, more convenient or more 
comfortable for patients.”9  Recent examples of approved combination 
products include: a fibrin sealant to assist sealing incisions received during 
surgery; a spinal fusion putty to help grow new spinal bone; a fibroblast-
derived dermal substitute to cover, support, and grow new skin over a 
wound; and new drug-eluting stents to open and prevent the re-narrowing of 
arteries.10   
                                                                                                                       
and biological products, or biological and drug products;  
 (3) A drug, device, or biological product packaged separately that 
according to its investigational plan or proposed labeling is intended for 
use only with an approved individually specified drug, device, or 
biological product where both are required to achieve the intended use, 
indication, or effect and where upon approval of the proposed product 
the labeling of the approved product would need to be changed, e.g., to 
reflect a change in intended use, dosage form, strength, route of 
administration, or significant change in dose; or  
 (4) Any investigational drug, device, or biological product 
packaged separately that according to its proposed labeling is for use 
only with another individually specified investigational drug, device, or 
biological product where both are required to achieve the intended use, 
indication, or effect. 
Id.  For the purposes of this paper, most of the discussion will focus on the first 
definition, where "two or more regulated components [are] physically, 
chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and produced as a single entity."  
Id. 
8 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 3.4(a), 3.2(b). 
9 See FDA Talk Paper, FDA Proposes Rule on "Combination" Products, U.S. 
Food and Drug Admin., Pub. No. T04-13 (May 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/ANS01288.html. 
10 Recent Examples of Combination Product Approvals, U.S. Food and Drug 
Admin., at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/approvals.html (last visited Sept. 
22, 2004).  In more detail, the FDA noted that 
innovative drug delivery devices have the potential to make treatments 
safer or more effective, or more convenient or acceptable to patients. 
Drug-eluting cardiovascular stents have the potential to reduce the need 
for surgery by preventing the restenosis that sometimes occurs 
following stent implantation. Drugs and biologics can be used in 
combination to potentially enhance the safety and/or effectiveness of 
either product used alone. Biologics are being incorporated into novel 
orthopedic implants to help facilitate the regeneration of bone required 
to permanently stabilize the implants. 
Overview of the Office of Combination Products, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 
at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/overview.html (last visited Sept. 22, 
2004). 
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 1 
¶4 In the future, combination products may well come to represent the 
most innovative products, as "research is being driven by the very concept 
of combinations."11  These products will likely continue to blur the 
boundaries between drugs, biologics, and devices.12  Because of the rising 
popularity and complexity of combination products, this iBrief reviews the 
FDA’s current regulatory system surrounding these products.  Further, it 
analyzes a recently proposed FDA rule that would codify a definition for a 
combination product's "primary mode of action."  In conclusion, because of 
the many shortcomings of both the current arrangement and the proposed 
regulation, this iBrief suggests that the correct course of action is for the 
FDA to stop assigning center jurisdiction based on a product’s "primary 
mode of action," and to give the Office of Combination Products internal 
agency jurisdiction over combination products. 
I. THE CURRENT REGULATORY SITUATION 
¶5 Currently, a combination product is routed to one of the FDA's 
regulatory product centers by the two-year old Office of Combination 
Products ("OCP").13  Its function is to "ensure the prompt assignment of 
combination products to agency centers, the timely and effective pre-market 
review of such products, and consistent and appropriate post-market 
regulation of like products subject to the same statutory requirements to the 
extent permitted by law."14  The OCP assigns a product to a center based on 
its "primary mode of action" ("PMOA").15  If the product's PMOA is 
determined to be that of a drug, biologic, or device, then the appropriate 
center for primary jurisdiction is the CDER, CBER, or CDRH, 
respectively.16  However, the term "primary mode of action"17 is not clearly 
defined by either statute or the FDA, and its application has caused 
                                                     
11 Combination Product Applications Increasing, Crossing Traditional FDA 
Medical Center Lines, THE FOOD & DRUG LETTER, Mar. 26, 2004, at 1, 4 
(quoting Janet Trunzo, senior vice president of global regulatory affairs at 
AdvaMed, a medical device trade group). 
12 See id. 
13 The OCP was created by the Medical Device User Fee Modernization Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250, § 204, 116 Stat. 1588, 1611 (to be codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 353(g)). 
14 21 U.S.C.A. § 353(g)(4)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). 
15 Id. § 353(g)(1).  PMOA itself is fairly new terminology, being created by the 
Safe Medical Device Act of 1990.  Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 16(a), 104 Stat. 4511, 
4526.  
16 See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 353(g)(1)(A)-(C). 
17 Id. § 353(g)(1). 
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confusion.18  Adding to this uncertainty are the FDA's stipulation that the 
center with primary jurisdiction may consult with other centers, and the 
possibility that the FDA may require marketing applications to multiple 
centers.19  In essence, the FDA has too many cooks in the regulatory 
kitchen, which leads to inefficient, subjective, unpredictable, and costly 
outcomes.  These snags in the system also fail to result in improved public 
safety.20 
¶6 There is no codified definition or method for determining a 
product's PMOA.  Therefore, the FDA determines center jurisdiction for 
many innovative products on a case-by-case basis;21  the relevant features 
for determining PMOA may lie in the "eye of the beholder."22  Furthermore, 
the determination may be influenced by what the sponsor does or does not 
claim and how the product has been designed to achieve a certain 
therapeutic benefit.23 
A. Differences between product centers 
¶7 There are substantial differences among the three FDA centers.  For 
example, in their requirements to demonstrate efficacy, the CDER and 
CBER require at least one, randomized, placebo-controlled study, whereas 
CDRH has usually been more flexible and typically accepts other study 
                                                     
18 Editor's Page: Unlocking the Future of Combination Products, MEDICAL 
DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Dec. 2002, available at 
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/02/12/001.html. 
19 21 C.F.R. § 3.4(b).  
20 Kshitij Mohan, Combination Products: Incrementalism Won't Work, 
MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, May 2002, at 52, available at 
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/02/05/017.html (conjecturing that the 
new regulations "end up delaying or denying benefits to patients without 
providing offsetting benefits of enhanced safety and effectiveness"). 
21 Barry S. Sall et. al, Getting Started with a Combination Product: Part I, 
MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Mar. 2003, at 54, available at 
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/03/03/018.html; see Sharon A. Segal, 
Device and Biologic Combination Products: Understanding the Evolving 
Regulation, MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Jan. 1999, at 180 
("Until [the FDA] establishes comprehensive and accurate processes for 
designating jurisdiction and determining a product's primary mode of action, the 
agency will continue to exercise its discretion on a flexible, case-by-case basis 
regarding the more-complex or problematic products."), available at 
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/99/01/016.html. 
22 David Smith, A Primer on Engineered Tissues and FDA Classification of 
Medical Products, PITTSBURGH TISSUE ENGINEERING INITIATIVE, available at 
http://www.ptei.org/Industry/FDAPrimer.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). 
23 Id. 
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designs. 24  Other differences between the centers include the following: 
"statutory differences in approval times, . . . a greater likelihood of securing 
approval for a product if it is designated as a device, . . . [and a] 
manufacturer may be more familiar with a particular center or . . . want to 
target a particular center for its tendency to evaluate certain types of 
evidence . . . ."25 
¶8 The classification of a medical product can have far-reaching 
effects.  A device classification may insulate a manufacturer from product 
liability litigation, whereas a drug or biologic classification does not afford 
such protection under the auspices of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act.26  For the 2005 fiscal year, application fees will also vary significantly 
among the different FDA combination product classifications; at their 
highest levels, device user application fees cost about $240,000,27 whereas 
user drug and biologic application fees cost over $670,000.28 
¶9 Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala29 exemplifies the negative 
effects of product classification.  In this case, ultrasound contrast agents, a 
device-drug combination product, were predominately assigned to the 
CDER, but one manufacturer's product was assigned to the CDRH.30  The 
pre-market review process differences were highlighted by one 
manufacturer's comments: "The usual development of a device takes less 
time than development as a drug.  It requires fewer patients and less safety 
and efficacy data.  This results in development cost savings and increased 
development speed."31  Additionally, in 1997, two of the manufacturers that 
had their products reviewed by the CDER had already incurred $1.5 million 
                                                     
24 Alison Lawton, An Industry Perspective on Regulatory Oversight of Cell and 
Tissue Based Products, 2000 PROC. WTEC WORKSHOP ON TISSUE ENGINEERING 
RES. U.S. 240-41, available at http://wtec.org/loyola/te/usws/usws-07.pdf. 
25 John Miller, Beyond Biotechnology: FDA Regulation of Nanomedicine,  
4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 5, at *23 (Apr. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=4&article=5 (footnotes omitted). 
26 David Smith, Legal and Regulatory Issues, 2002 WTEC PANEL REPORT ON 
TISSUE ENGINEERING RES. 81, 83, available at 
http://wtec.org/loyola/te/final/te_final.pdf.; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (2000). 
27 Establishment of Medical Device User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year  
2005, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,153, 46,155 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
28 Establishment of Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2005, 69 
Fed. Reg. 46,165, 46,168 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
29 963 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1997). 
30 Id. at 24. 
31 Id. at 29. 
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and $3.7 million more in expenses than if their products had been assigned 
to the CDRH.32 
¶10 In addition to initial discrepancies between the regulatory pathways 
and user fees at each of the centers, there are more subtle differences.  For 
instance, if a product is classified as a biologic or a drug, it can obtain 
"orphan drug" status, which provides numerous benefits. 33  However, if the 
product is considered a device, it can only obtain a "humanitarian device 
exemption."34  The most significant difference between the two designations 
is that a humanitarian device can only be intended to treat a disease that 
affects fewer than 4,000 people in the United States while an orphan drug 
can intend to treat a disease that affects up to 200,000 people.35  In addition, 
an orphan drug can be granted market exclusivity for seven years from the 
date of FDA approval, which is typically longer and less expensive than the 
exclusivity obtainable by a patent.36  An orphan drug can also receive 
"certain tax credits for clinical research expenses; cash grant support for 
clinical trials; and waiver of the expensive prescription drug filing fee."37 
¶11 After a medical product's approval, its classification has effects 
outside the FDA's immediate sphere of influence.  For instance, sales 
representatives for drugs and devices are treated differently by hospitals and 
clinics; while drug representatives are typically restricted, device 
representatives have "almost unlimited access to their physician 
customers."38 
¶12 Stepping back inside the doors of the FDA, there can be problems 
when a center obtains primary jurisdiction over a product with which it has 
limited familiarity.  The "designated center could very well lack necessary 
information regarding components of the product that are outside its area of 
                                                     
32 See Id. at 29 n.9.  Ultimately, the court held that when regulating and 
reviewing a combination product, the FDA has discretion in how to treat the 
product, but it is not allowed to treat two similar products dissimilarly on two 
different regulatory tracks, without legitimate justification.  Id. at 28. 
33 Smith, supra note 26, at 84. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Fred Gebhart, Do Combination Products Spark Turf Wars? Hospital 
Practice., DRUG TOPICS, Oct. 7, 2002, at 42.  A manufacturer of a drug 
orthopedic sleeve stated that "[a]pproval as a device is crucial to physician 
access and to our sales effort."  Id. (quoting Andrew Burns, spokesman for 
Smith & Nephew, a medical device manufacturer). 
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expertise."39  However, the FDA has procedures and mechanisms in place 
intended to help alleviate these concerns. 
B. Inadequate agreements 
¶13 Presently, the FDA attempts to bolster its assignment of 
combination products through intercenter agreements, which are documents 
the FDA has promulgated to clarify product jurisdiction questions between 
two centers.40  Originally created in 1991, the agreements "describe the 
allocation of responsibility, by center, for categories of products or specific 
products which are a biologic, a device, or a drug."41  They also describe 
methods for resolving disputes and conducting collaborative reviews.42   
¶14 Unfortunately, the agreements are behind the times.  In 2002, the 
FDA realized this problem and called for a public hearing on the topic,43  
stating, "[w]hile the Intercenter Agreements continue to provide useful 
guidance, the evolution in technology and scientific knowledge about the 
mode of action of medical products has in some cases pushed the usefulness 
of the current Intercenter Agreements past their limits."44  Unfortunately, 
the FDA will likely answer questions regarding combination products 
slowly, as the Agency itself is uncertain about the "process and leadership 
traceable to the inadequacy of the intercenter agreements" and because of 
the recent creation of the OCP.45 
                                                     
39 Segal, supra note 21.  
40 21 C.F.R. § 3.5(a)(1).  The titles are as follows: 
‘‘Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health;’’ 
‘‘Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research;’’ 
‘‘Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research.’’ 
Id.  The agreements are available at the following internet address: 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/intercenter.html (last visited Sept. 22, 
2004). 
41 Assignment of Agency Component for Review of Premarket Applications; 
Guidance Documents Entitled Intercenter Agreements for Biologic, Device and 
Drug Products; Availability, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,760, 58,760 (Nov. 21, 1991); see 
21 C.F.R. § 3.5(a)(2). 
42 Id. 
43 See FDA Regulation of Combination Products; Public Hearing, 67 Fed. Reg. 
65,801 (Oct. 28, 2002). 
44 Id. at 65,802. 
45 Ken Sumner, Attitude Adjustment, MX, May/June 2003, available at 
http://www.devicelink.com/mx/archive/03/05/sumner.html. 
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¶15 The intercenter agreements are only useful if a product's 
characteristics are clear or specifically listed in the agreements; if not, the 
agreements can be vague and difficult to understand.46  Contributing to this 
quandary is the fact that the agreements are not binding,47 and do not cover 
the increasingly common situation where a combination product 
encompasses the characteristics of a drug, a biologic, and a device because 
the agreements are only between two centers, not three—there is no 
tripartite agreement for a medical product having characteristics of all three 
categories.  Therefore, while the agreements are a good attempt to solve 
past jurisdictional questions, they are not equipped to handle new, 
innovative products that encompass technologies not yet envisioned. 
C. Time delays  
¶16 If a product is not listed in the appropriate intercenter agreement or 
if the proper center is uncertain, a sponsor can file a Request for 
Designation ("RFD").48  The sponsor provides information in the RFD to 
inform the FDA which center it believes would be the most appropriate.49  
While an RFD may be useful to third parties who are similarly situated with 
a similar product, the filings "are highly confidential, just [knowledge of] 
the existence of a letter would give away a significant trade secret."50  
Therefore, the general lack of guidance for innovative products can also be 
attributable to confidentiality concerns.51  Also, the FDA's decision on an 
RFD is not binding, and requests are determined on a case-by-case basis.52  
For all of these reasons, the regulatory statuses for advanced medical 
technologies can remain unknown for extended periods of time.53 
                                                     
46 Mary McNamara-Cullinane, Understanding the Request for Designation 
(RFD) - A Critical Step in the FDA Regulatory Process for Combination 
Products, REGULATORY, CLINICAL, & COMPLIANCE NEWSLETTER (Medical 
Device Consultants, Inc., North Attleboro, Mass.), Mar. 2004, at 
http://www.mdci.com/pages/nwsltr_0403.html. 
47 21 C.F.R. § 3.5(a)(2). 
48 Id. §§ 3.5(b), 3.7. 
49 Id. § 3.7(c)(2)(ix). 
50 Flexible, Tailored Regulation Seen as Combo Product Key, THE FOOD & 
DRUG LETTER, Aug. 15, 2003 (modification in original) (quoting Mark Kramer, 
director of the FDA's Office of Combination Products) (available on Lexis). 
51 Sall et al., supra note 21, at 54. 
52 Id. 
53 Id; see Miller, supra note 25, at *25 (stating that the process for determining 
primary jurisdiction is "time-intensive"). 
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¶17 For most medical products, especially innovative combination 
products, time is of the essence.54  Among other things, delays in the 
regulatory process can delay or destroy projects, diminish investors’ returns, 
and impact millions of people's lives by delaying or denying access to 
innovative products.55  In fact, stakeholders have become frustrated because 
innovation in this field is far outpacing regulatory approvals;56 the current 
combination product regulatory approach has even been declared "woefully 
inadequate" by one commentator.57  The PMOA process may be logical, but 
it is not practical as it does not allow for effective assignment "based on 
center resources and expertise."58 
¶18 Further adding to the consternation of moving a combination 
product through the FDA, a product sponsor can be certain that they will 
encounter numerous entities within the Agency.  Not only are there 
potentially two product centers to interact with, but the Office of the 
Ombudsman, which used to handle the OCP's functions, is still involved 
even after the creation of the OCP;59 thus, a sponsor must interact with the 
center having primary jurisdiction, potentially one or two consulting 
centers, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the OCP.60  A non-combination 
medical product, such as a straightforward drug, biologic, or device, would 
not have to navigate the same maze, bypassing the combination product 
regulations. 
D. Taking care of business 
¶19 The ambiguity created when attempting to classify cutting-edge 
technology has led business considerations, rather than safety concerns, to 
drive the decision of which center a sponsor will suggest for jurisdiction.61  
One consultant advises companies to position their products to increase the 
                                                     
54 Gail Naughton, An Industry Imperiled by Regulatory Bottlenecks, 19 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 709, 709 (2001). 
55 Id. at 709. 
56 Id. at 710. 
57 Editor's Page: Unlocking the Future of Combination Products, supra note 18 
58 Id. (quoting Suzanne O'Shea, Product Jurisdiction Officer in the FDA's Office 
of the Ombudsman). 
59 Sumner, supra note 45.  The Office of the Ombudsman now determines if a 
product is a combination product, while the OCP assigns product jurisdiction 
and sets appropriate policies.  Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Sall et al., supra note 21, at 54 (stating that "the developer must select 
which center to propose for primary jurisdiction" and that "[b]usiness 
considerations frequently drive this decision"). 
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chance of "obtaining a favorable jurisdictional decision."62  Such advice is 
only a logical outcome from an amorphous regulatory situation because 
investors and company management want to know what type of medical 
product company they are dealing with—drug, biologic, or device—as this 
determination will establish the timeline for their revenue stream.63  In 
addition, because precedent is not binding, the company must be prepared 
to justify product classification to all of the possible product centers.64 
E. Looking forward 
¶20 It is important to be aware of significant developing medical 
technology fields where combination products will play a large role.  Tissue 
engineering is such a field worthy of attention, for not only the innovative 
medical advancements it encompasses, but also for financial reasons.  One 
study forecasted that the tissue engineering market will develop into an 
annual $196 billion industry by 2013.65 
¶21 Tissue engineering is a broad field that is difficult to narrowly 
define.66  One of the more straightforward definitions states that tissue 
engineering is "the persuasion of the body to heal itself through the delivery 
to the appropriate sites, of molecular signals, cells, and supporting 
structures."67  These three areas correlate with the FDA's product centers; 
therefore, tissue engineered products have the potential to cross all three 
lines of the FDA's categorical approach.  In fact, one commentator 
                                                     
62 McNamara-Cullinane, supra note 46.  A favorable decision is often viewed as 
occurring when the FDA assigns a combination product to the CDRH.  FDA 
Defines 'Primary Mode of Action’ for Combination Products, GUIDE TO 
MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION (Thompson Publishing Group, Inc., Washington, 
D.C.), June 2004, at 
http://www.thompson.com/libraries/fooddrug/xray/samplenews/xray0406.html.  
Prior to the Agency's rule proposal regarding a product's PMOA, an industry 
group urged the FDA for "maximum use of device jurisdiction and authorities," 
noting that the CDRH had received "years of combination product assignments."  
Id. 
63 Sall et al., supra note 21, at 54. 
64 Id. 
65 Bio-Engineered Cardiovascular and Skin Repair and Replacement Products 
to Lead Growth in the U.S. and Worldwide Tissue Engineering Markets, 
According to Medtech Insight Analysis, BUSINESS WIRE, Aug. 9, 2004 (available 
on Lexis). 
66 JACQUELINE SENKER, HUMAN TISSUE-ENGINEERED PRODUCTS: TODAY'S 
MARKETS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS: LEGAL SITUATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF TISSUE ENGINEERING 3 (April 2003), available at 
http://lifesciences.jrc.es/docs/TE_WP4_FinalReport.pdf.  
67 Id. 
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suggested that a better designation for tissue engineered products might be 
as "biodeviceuticals."68 
¶22 Such a biodeviceutical was involved in a critical tissue engineering 
patent that was recently listed as one of ten patents that "shook up 
society."69  A product resulting from the patent would undoubtedly be a 
combination product: the patent covered regeneration of spinal tissue using 
"a sponge-like scaffolding filled with a special hydrogel containing adult 
stem cells."70 The scaffolding and hydrogel would likely be considered 
medical devices and the cellular component would likely be viewed as a 
biologic.71 
¶23 The FDA is actively engaged in developing rational product 
development pathways, but these must fit into the existing well-established 
statutory scheme for classifying medical products.72  Tissue engineered 
products do not fit well into this regulatory arrangement.73   
¶24 The Agency's classification has broader implications than just 
indicating the center with jurisdictional and approval pathways for a 
product.74  The classification of tissue engineered products may cause those 
products' commercial development to be more dependent on the regulatory 
approval process than on clinical outcomes.75  The inconsistencies in the 
regulatory process "would increase the complexity of introducing new 
medical technologies incorporating human tissues without materially 
advancing public health or safety."76 
¶25 Tissue engineering products are usually assigned to either the 
CBER or the CDRH, which have different statutory standards for 
                                                     
68 Naughton, supra note 54, at 709. (adding that these are "products that replace 
a tissue, tissue component, or a whole organ, which are bio-interactive and 
respond to the physiological needs of their local environment"). 
69 Alan Cohen, 10 Patents That Changed the World, IP WORDWIDE, Aug. 8, 
2002, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1028321279955. 
70 Alan Cohen, Not Quite the Bionic Man, IP WORDWIDE, Aug. 8, 2002, at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1028321282569. 
71 See Segal supra note 21 (noticing that a similar product, combining cells and 
scaffolding to treat skin wounds, met the requirements for a biologic and a 
device). 
72 Smith, supra note 26, at 81. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 82. 
75 Id. at 94. 
76 David Smith, Introduction to Legal and Regulatory Issues, 2000 PROC. 
WTEC WORKSHOP ON TISSUE ENGINEERING RES. U.S. 225, 227 available at 
http://wtec.org/loyola/te/usws/usws-07.pdf. 
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determining safety and efficacy.77  The CDRH looks at whether a product is 
"safe and effective,"78 whereas the CBER looks at a product's "saf[ety], 
pur[ity], and poten[cy]."79  One researcher cited this difference among 
others in stating that the ability to take a tissue engineered product "from 
'bench to bedside' is fraught with a litany of administrative guidelines."80  
The scientist noted that these products must comply with the CBER's drug-
like requirements of demonstrating a product's "dose and potency."81  There 
are difficulties in proving these conditions for tissue engineered products 
which incorporate living cells.82  This problem does not exist under the 
device standards of the CDRH.83 
¶26 Tissue engineering exemplifies the trials and tribulations that must 
be overcome to bring a modern medical combination product to market.  
Unforeseen innovative technologies would likely encounter similar hurdles 
if the regulatory situation remains static.  In light of these growing concerns, 
the FDA has not sat idle. 
II. THE FDA’S SOLUTION   
¶27 In May 2004, the FDA proposed a new rule to address many of the 
matters discussed above.84  The proposed rule's purpose is two-fold: "(1) to 
codify . . . the criterion the FDA has used for more than a decade when 
assigning combination products to a particular Center within the agency for 
review; and (2) to simplify the assignment process."85  In addition, the FDA 
explained, the new rule should "promote the public health by codifying the 
agency's criteria for the assignment of combination products in transparent, 
consistent, and predictable terms."86  Unfortunately, the new rule does not 
                                                     
77 See Smith, supra note 22 (stating that "there may be some subtle variation in 
the measurement of [safety and efficacy] among the FDA Centers"). 
78 Smith, supra note 26, at 87; see 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1). 
79 Smith, supra note 26, at 88; see 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(I). 
80 Kenji Izumi et al., Development of a Tissue-Engineered Human Oral Mucosa: 
From the Bench to the Bed Side, 176 CELLS TISSUES ORGANS 134, 149 (2004). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 25,527 (proposed May 7, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3) 
[hereinafter Rule Proposal]. 
85 FDA Talk Paper, supra note 9. 
86 Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,527. 
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generate the reform required for the regulation of combination products.  As 
of December 31, 2004, the rule had not been adopted.87 
A. The proposal 
¶28 The FDA's proposal would amend its current regulations in two 
substantive parts.  First, the proposed rule would codify a definition for a 
product's PMOA.,88 the statutory standard that determines which product 
center has jurisdiction for a combination product.89  Second, a two-tiered 
algorithm would be implemented when a product's PMOA is not evident.90 
¶29 The proposal explains that a product's PMOA is "the single mode of 
action of a combination product that provides the most important 
therapeutic action of the combination product."91  The most important 
therapeutic action is defined as "the mode of action expected to make the 
greatest contribution to the overall therapeutic effects of the combination 
product."92  "Mode of action" is categorized as either that of a drug, 
biological product, or device.93  In the process of formulating the proposal, 
stakeholders informed the FDA that the PMOA should focus on the product 
as a whole, and the Agency agreed,94 stating that the PMOA assignment 
will be based on the most important therapeutic action of the product as a 
whole.95 
¶30 Novel products that combine aspects of a drug, biologic, or device 
will not always have a single mode of action that provides the most 
important therapeutic action.96  In these cases, the FDA's assignment 
algorithm fills the gap.  This two-tiered algorithm is spelled out in the 
proposed rule as follows: 
[T]he agency will assign the combination product to the agency 
component that regulates other combination products that present 
similar questions of safety and effectiveness with regard to the 
                                                     
87 For up-to-date information on the status of the new rule see 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination. 
88 Id. at 25,528.  The rule proposal also defines "mode of action," which would 
only apply to a portion of a combination product, as combination products 
typically will have more than one mode of action.  Id. 
89 21 U.S.C.A. § 353(g)(1). 
90 Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,528. 
91 Id. at 25,532 (proposed section 3.2(m)). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. (proposed section 3.2(k)). 
94 Id. at 25,528. 
95 Id.  However, the "as a whole" terminology was not included in the proposed 
rule.  See id. at 25,532 (proposed section 3.2(k)).  
96 Id. (proposed section 3.4(b)). 
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combination product as a whole.  When there are no other combination 
products that present similar questions of safety and effectiveness with 
regard to the combination product as a whole, the agency will assign 
the combination product to the agency component with the most 
expertise related to the most significant safety and effectiveness 
questions presented by the combination product.97
¶31 Practically speaking, the proposed assignment system would first 
identify the combination product's modes of action and then ask a series of 
threshold questions as follows: 
1. "Which mode of action is the most important 
therapeutic action of the combination product?";98 
2. "Is there an agency component that regulates other 
combination products that present similar questions of 
safety and effectiveness with regard to the 
combination product as a whole?";99 and 
3. "Which agency component has the most expertise 
related to the most significant safety and effectiveness 
questions presented by the combination product?"100 
¶32 The rule proposal also included three examples for assigning 
products.  These examples included analysis of a "conventional drug-eluting 
stent", a "drug-eluting disc", and a "contact lens combined with a drug to 
treat glaucoma."101  The examples designated jurisdiction to the CDRH, 
CDER, and CDER, respectively.102  There was not an example of a product 
being assigned to the CBER. 
                                                     
97 Id.  "Agency component" refers to either the CDER, CBER, or CDRH.  21 
C.F.R. § 3.2(b). 
98 Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,533 (visually outlining the proposed 
assignment system). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 25,529-30. 
102 Id. 
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B. The response 
¶33 Two industry groups, AdvaMed103 and BIO,104 filed comments 
regarding the proposed rule.  First, the associations felt that it was important 
that the new rule more directly address the role of FDA jurisdictional 
precedents.105  Second, the groups advised the Agency to further clarify how 
it would evaluate the PMOA by considering the combination product as a 
whole.106  Third, AdvaMed desired that the last tier of the assignment 
algorithm focus "on the [the center with the] most significant safety and 
effectiveness questions presented by the combination product" instead of on 
"the [center with the] most expertise related to the most significant safety 
and effectiveness question presented by the combination product."107  
Lastly, both associations expressed concerns with the simplicity of the 
examples that the FDA had included in the rule proposal.108 
C. The new rule does not substantially change the situation 
¶34 Despite the best efforts of the FDA and the conscientious comments 
of industry groups, the new rule will not eliminate the concerns arising out 
of the current assignment system.  In fact, the Agency and industry 
stakeholders appear to be mostly concerned with maintaining the status quo.    
¶35 The FDA stated that the rule's criteria are the same as the Agency 
has used in the past; the rule will only formalize the process.109  In the rule 
proposal itself, the FDA stated that the "[t]his proposal would merely clarify 
and codify principles the agency has generally used since section 503(g) [21 
U.S.C. § 353(g)] of the act was issued in 1990."110  Despite the proposed 
                                                     
103 AdvaMed is the Advanced Medical Technology Association and "represents 
more than 1,200 innovators and manufacturers of medical devices, diagnostic 
products, and medical information systems."  Letter from Carolyn D. Jones, 
Associate Vice President of Technology & Regulatory Affairs, AdvaMed, to 
FDA, 1 (Aug. 20, 2004) [hereinafter AdvaMed Letter], available at 
http://www.advamed.org/publicdocs/cjones_ltr_8-20-04.pdf. 
104 BIO is the Biotechnology Industry Organization, and "represents more than 
1,000 biotechnology companies, academic institutions, state biotechnology 
centers and related organizations."  Letter from Sara Radcliffe, Managing 
Director of Science and Regulatory Affairs, BIO, to FDA 1 (Aug. 20, 2004) 
[hereinafter BIO Letter], at http://www.bio.org/reg/20040820.asp. 
105 AdvaMed Letter, supra note 103, at 3; BIO Letter, supra note 104, at 2. 
106 AdvaMed Letter, supra note 103, at 7; BIO Letter, supra note 104, at 2. 
107 AdvaMed Letter, supra note 103, at 9. 
108 Id. at 10; BIO Letter, supra note 104, at 3. 
109 FDA Unveils Plans on Combo Products, THE BBI NEWSLETTER (American 
Health Consultants, Inc., Monvale, N.J.), June 1, 2004, at 180. 
110 Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,528 (emphasis added). 
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rule's intent "to clarify and shed some transparency on the process, [it] 
doesn't seem to change much."111  The FDA has been following the same 
principles for almost 14 years; thus if it simply formalizes, clarifies, and 
codifies those processes that have been regularly utilized, there will be little 
substantive change to address the concerns raised above.  
¶36 The vagueness of the statutory phrase "primary mode of action,"112 
which is the source of the problems discussed above, would not change.  
The concern with the current PMOA classification system is that "some 
subjectivity is necessary . . . yielding a lack of consistency, predictability 
and transparency."113  The ambiguity is intrinsic to the phrase itself.  It 
assumes that every combination product which exists has a primary mode 
of action.  Unfortunately, a combination product can have two or more 
"therapeutic actions" equally contributing to a product’s "overall therapeutic 
effects."114  This can result in similar products being assigned to different 
centers, further decreasing the FDA's efficiency.115 
¶37 The examples discussed in the rule proposal also confirm the 
subjectivity of the algorithm.  In the rule proposal, two similar products, a 
drug-eluting stent and a drug-eluting disc were assigned to the CDRH and 
CDER respectively.116  The differing centers were assigned despite the fact 
that both products were implantable devices that used a drug to achieve a 
therapeutic effect.117 
                                                     
111 Cindy Becker, Combo Devices Blur FDA Lines, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 
17, 2004, at 20. 
112 21 U.S.C.A. 353(g)(1). 
113 Risk Should Drive Combo Product Jurisdiction, Industry Recommends, 
DEVICES & DIAGNOSTICS LETTER, Dec. 2, 2002 (quoting Mark Hamblin, a 
researcher with Carnegie Mellon University) (available on Lexis). 
114 See Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,532 (proposed section 3.2(m)).  For 
example, an "interactive wound-care product" (Apligraf, Organogenesis Inc.) 
combined living cells with scaffolding, forming a cellular interactive biologic-
device product.  Segal, supra note 21.  The living cells comprise the biologic 
and the mechanical scaffolding comprises the device.  Id.  Both modes of action 
significantly contributed to the product's therapeutic function, as the cells 
accelerated healing by providing a therapeutic effect via interactions with the 
wound, and the scaffolding accelerated healing by providing a therapeutic effect 
via enhancement of the wound's mechanical strength.  See id. 
115 One commentator discusses just such a situation arising with interactive 
wound-care products where the acellular product (Regranex gel, OMJ 
Pharmaceuticals Inc.) was assigned to the CDER while the cellular product 
(Apligraf) was assigned to the CDRH.  Segal, supra note 21.   
116 Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,529-30. 
117 See id.  
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¶38 The other issues would also remain because the difficulty in 
determining a product's PMOA still exist.  The proposed rule would still 
require an inefficient case-by-case analysis by multiple FDA offices and 
centers, maintain the questionable RFD process, and continue to result in 
significant product review and approval delays.  Business recommendations 
rather than safety concerns would also still drive RFD letters for new 
innovative products.  Further, the intercenter agreements have not been 
updated and, even if they were, would not likely help future, unforeseen 
products.  Lastly, significantly disparate treatment for similar products 
regulated by different centers would persist.  There would be differences in 
product liability, cost, available special designations, and expertise between 
the centers.  Consequently, at best the assignment process would take 
additional time; at worst "the process [would] kill a promising technology 
because the time, expense, and uncertainty make development economically 
unacceptable."118 
III. SOLUTIONS: BIG AND SMALL 
A. Alternatives to the new rule under the current statutory scheme 
¶39 Alternative solutions that would not require major modifications to 
the statutory scheme have been proposed.  For example, industry 
representatives agree that the FDA could propose a number of alternative 
methods for determining jurisdiction by focusing on different categorical 
schemes.119 
                                                     
118 Mohan, supra note 20, at 52.  The author goes on to criticize the multi-center 
approach because it involves the following: (1) "three mutually exclusive 
organizations", (2) "three disparate sets of legal and regulatory requirements," 
(3) human beings, and (4) "the diversity of imaginative combinations that these 
products entail."  Id. 
119  Biotech Combination Product Makers Facing New Designation Issues at 
FDA, THE FOOD & DRUG LETTER, Aug. 15, 2003 (available on Lexis).  These 
alternative methods to determine jurisdiction included the following focal 
points: 
Mode of use; Whether the product has a local, regional or systematic 
effect; Which component of the product presents the greatest risk; 
Primary mode of therapeutic action; Whether one component serves 
only as a vehicle to deliver a therapeutic; How similar products are 
regulated; What feature of the product predominates or represents the 
innovations; and Which center has the best clinical skills and expertise 
to assist the sponsor with clinical trial design. 
Id. 
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¶40 Another proposal suggested the adoption of a "risk-based 
classification system."120  In this arrangement, product center jurisdiction 
would be determined by evaluating "the element of the product that poses 
the greatest risk to patient safety . . . and 'which center has the greatest 
experience managing that risk.'"121  Alternatively, one researcher 
recommended a lengthy "88-item weighted checklist that evaluates critical 
characteristics of each product."122 
¶41 The problem with these approaches is that they are variations of the 
same theme: determining what is the most important aspect of a 
combination product for classification purposes.  Despite the combination 
product program's objective to make certain that combination product 
review is as efficient as possible, the process will never be as efficient as 
with a non-combination product because the products are more complex and 
more than one center is involved.123  The problems associated with using 
multiple centers will likely persist; multiple center applications, 
communications, and other extraneous transactions will continue to bog 
down the regulatory system for combination products.  A completely new 
methodology and organizational arrangement is needed for products that 
blur the boundaries between the traditional categorizations of drugs, 
biologics, and devices. 
B. New statute, new center, and a better approach 
¶42 Initially, the source of the assignment problem must be addressed.  
Currently, much of the consternation stems from the difficulty in classifying 
a combination product.  Whether PMOA or some other definition is 
adopted, classification would still be an issue.  Which center should be 
assigned which combination products?  In answering this question, it is 
important to realize that there is nothing special about the current 
categorizations between drugs, biologics, and devices. 124  One commentator 
                                                     
120 Risk Should Drive Combo Product Jurisdiction, Industry Recommends, supra 
note 113. 
121 Id. (quoting Owen Fields, associate director of worldwide regulatory affairs 
at Wyeth). 
122 Risk Should Drive Combo Product Jurisdiction, Industry Recommends, supra 
note 113. 
123 Robert Drummond, Combination Product Reform to Speed Reviews, Increase 
Accountability, MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Apr. 2002, at 20, 
available at http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/02/04/013.html.  
Determining the best way to make center designations has been analogized to 
"measuring length to the fourth decimal place with a crooked ruler."  Mohan, 
supra note 20, at 52. 
124 Mohan, supra note 20, at 52. 
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noted that "[t]he future of medical technologies should not be held hostage 
to history."125  Therefore, the statutory provision mandating the FDA to 
assign jurisdiction based on a product's PMOA126 should be eliminated.  
Doing so would remove the problem at its source. 
¶43 Next, what is needed is not necessarily less regulation of 
combination products, but a less complex system.  Removing the statutory 
authority and guidance for FDA regulation and review of combination 
products will create a vacuum for those tasks.   Filling this void, the OCP 
should be more than just a gate-keeping service of the FDA.  It should have 
internal agency jurisdiction over the products and directly oversee their pre-
market review and regulation.  In this sense, it would develop into another 
product center.   
¶44 This view is well expressed by another commentator, Kshitij 
Mohan.127  Mohan believes that the best place to initially reorganize the 
OCP is within the CDRH.128  This center has had the most exposure to 
combination products over its history and is the most flexible of the three 
medical product centers.129  The new OCP would draw a staff from an 
interdisciplinary team of personnel currently in the other three centers and 
utilize joint appointments for some scientists and reviewers.  130  Over time, 
the new OCP would develop into its own center.131 
¶45 Sowing the seeds for a new medical product center should increase 
consistency in the regulation of novel combination products.  This solution 
would improve the current situation by improving "healthcare through a 
more efficient partnership among FDA, academia, and industry to speed the 
introduction of beneficial new technologies."132  It also "could become a 
model for how all of FDA will evolve to meet the changing needs of the 
21st century."133 
¶46 In addition, a new OCP or center would follow the FDA's ongoing 
efforts and the recently-announced 'Critical Path' initiative, which 
emphasizes clarifying the complex therapeutic development process and 
                                                     
125 Id. 
126 21 U.S.C.A. § 353(g). 
127 Mohan, supra note 20, at 52. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
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helping to speed innovation.134  The new entity would not have to spend 
much time analyzing where in the FDA a combination product should be 
evaluated.  The inefficiencies of requiring a sponsor to over-communicate 
with the FDA's numerous combination product-specific entities would be 
gone.  The time lost from interacting with those entities and waiting for 
RFDs to be fulfilled would also be eliminated.  Intercenter agreements, 
business driving jurisdictional decisions, and the major substantive product 
differences resulting from center assignment would be removed. 
¶47 As with most major changes, there will undoubtedly be some 
resistance.  A grandfather clause may be necessary to allay concerns 
amongst current stakeholders who may feel that it would be unfair to 
reassign their currently regulated or forthcoming products to the sole and 
direct authority of the new OCP.  However, Congress may have to directly 
authorize this, as the court in Bracco held that the FDA is not free to place 
similar products on separate regulatory tracks without legitimate reason.135 
¶48 Also, many companies rely on classifications to determine their 
sales strategies and they may negatively react to moving future products 
into a new center or new OCP.   For instance, device sales representatives 
currently have better physician access than do drug sales representatives.136  
Therefore, changing the regulatory scheme by doing away with a 
combination product's primary association with the CDER, CBER, or 
CDRH could be resisted by industry because of its current business model. 
¶49 On the government's tab, creating a new OCP or center will not be 
inexpensive.  The staff, reorganization, and start-up costs may be high.  
Currently the FDA lacks sufficient funds to move combination products 
forward.137  Additionally, FDA regulatory staff size has decreased while the 
number of pre-market approvals has increased.138  The director of the 
CDRH estimates that half of the staff currently in the center will retire or 
resign in between 2006 and 2011.139  The director's biggest challenge is to 
obtain sufficient funding "to hire qualified reviewers."140  Consequently, 
                                                     
134 See FDA, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW 
MEDICAL PRODUCTS iv (2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.pdf. 
135 Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 28 (D.D.C. 1997). 
136 Gebhart, supra note 38, at 42. 
137 Naughton, supra note 54, at 710. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. (quoting Advamed Urges FDA to Create New Combination Products 
Office, DEVICES & DIAGNOSTICS LETTER, June 22, 2001 (quoting David Feigal, 
director of the CDRH)). 
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manpower and funds will be lacking across the board at the FDA and 
reorganizing a new regulatory body will be difficult. 
¶50 However, these expenses can likely be absorbed in two ways.  First, 
if Mohan's advice is followed and the new regulatory body is created within 
the CDRH, then much of the overhead for starting a new center should be 
reduced.  Second, if combination products reach their market potential, then 
the increased user fees, combined with a more efficient combination 
product regulatory scheme, should help fund additional costs.  
CONCLUSION 
¶51 For combination products, the current multi-center assignment 
system, utilizing a product's "primary mode of action," should be eliminated 
and the OCP should be more than just a gate-keeping service of the FDA.  
Specifically, the OCP should have internal agency jurisdiction over 
combination products and oversee their review and regulation by drawing 
on the strengths of the other three centers. Keeping combination products 
within the redesigned OCP should increase consistency in the regulation of 
these novel products.  This solution will improve the current situation and 
follow the FDA's ongoing efforts and recently-announced 'Critical Path' 
initiative, which emphasizes further clarifying the complex therapeutic 
development process and helping to speed innovation. 
 
